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WHAT YOU SEE IS WHAT YOU GET... TO COPY
In the Ninth Federal Circuit, you may be prohibited from copying
the audiovisual screen display generated by a copyrighted computer pro-
gram. In the Third and Eleventh Federal Circuits, such copying may be
lawful. An Eleventh Circuit District Court in Digital Communications v.
Softlkone Distributing' ("Softklone") expressly rejected the conclusion
reached by a district court in the Ninth Circuit.2 The Softkione court, in
agreement with a Third Circuit appellate court,3 concluded that copy-
right protection of a computer program does not extend to its audiovi-
sual screen display.4
The Softklone decision emphasizes the apparent anomaly whereby a
copyright in an audiovisual screen display may protect its underlying
computer program, but a copyright in a computer program will not pro-
tect its audiovisual screen display.5
The original plaintiff in the action, Microstuff, Incorporated ("Mic-
rostuff "), a Georgia corporation organized in 1979, developed and mar-
keted the "Crosstalk" system in the early 1980's.6 The Crosstalk
computer program creates a computer data communications system
which enables computers to communicate with one another by accessing
and transferring data between themselves. Microstuff continued develop-
ment on Crosstalk, and in 1983 began marketing an updated version,
Crosstalk XVI (version 3.6).'
A key feature of the highly successful Crosstalk XVI system was its
"status screen" screen display, also known as its "main menu." This
display appears immediately following the "boot-up" or sign-on screen
display and displays the system's parameter and command terms.8
1. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
2. Id. But see Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133
(N.D. Cal. 1986) ("[C]opyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer
program, but rather... extends to the overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual
displays.").
3. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 455 ("The Whelan [Third Circuit] case did not stand for, as
Broderbund [Ninth Circuit] believed it to, the proposition that screen displays are protected by
the computer program's copyright from copying."). See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text.
4. Id. at 456.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 452.
7. Id.
8. Copies of both Digital's Crosstalk XVI and Softklone's Mirror status screens are ap-
pended as Exhibits A and B, respectively. The status screen display appears immediately after
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Alongside each term, the value of each parameter at which the program
is operating is indicated, thereby constantly informing the operator of the
operating status of the program. The user may select these values or the
system will do so by default.
In October of 1985, Microstuff received copyright registrations for
version 3.6 of the Crosstalk XVI computer program9 and user manual.'o
In December of 1985, Microstuff applied for copyright registration of
version 3.6 of the Crosstalk XVI "Main Menu" (status screen) display.
The status screen was registered as a "compilation of program terms" by
the United States Copyright Office.1 On February 6, 1986, Microstuff
received copyright registration for a second version of the status screen. 12
Microstuff then placed copyright notices in the computer program's
source code, on the box containing the computer program diskette, in the
"boot-up" or sign-on screen display appearing when the program begins,
and on every page of the user manual.
13
A defendant, ForeTec Development Corporation ("ForeTec"), a
Florida corporation, obtained a commercially available copy of Crosstalk
XVI and decided in the summer of 1985 to "clone" it. ForeTec's legal
counsel advised ForeTec that the Crosstalk XVI program's source and
object codes' 4 and user manual were copyrightable, but the status screen
was not.' 5 ForeTec developed "Mirror" and marketed it in December of
the initial "boot-up" or sign-on screen display. In the upper portion it contains an arrange-
ment of parameter/command terms. These terms are grouped under various descriptive head-
ings. Next to each term is a value, either numerical or textual, reflecting the value of the
parameter at which the computer program is operating. Each value is either selected by de-
fault by the computer for the user, or by the user. To select a value, the user merely types the
first two letters, which are capitalized and highlighted, of the command term they wish to
access.
The lower portion of the status screen display, excluding the last line, is called the "win-
dow." It can display text selected by the user. By typing in the "HElp" command, the user
can cause the "window" to display all the parameter/command terms. The terms are listed in
four alphabetical groupings. The first group appears upon typing "HElp," and by pressing the
"enter" key on the keyboard the remaining groups will appear.
The last line in the display is the "command" line. That is where the user enters a "com-
mand" or instruction to the computer to change any of the values at which it operates. Enter-
ing a command to change a value alters the corresponding value in the upper portion of the
status screen display alongside its parameter/command term. Id. at 452-53.
9. Sofiklone, 659 F. Supp. at 453 (copyright registration number TX-1-657-208).
10. Id. (copyright registration number TX-1-657-201).
11. Id. (copyright registration number TX-l-719-301).
12. Id. (copyright registration number TX-1-735-829).
13. Id.
14. Source code is the "language" in which a computer programmer writes the commands
telling a computer which operations or calculations to perform. Object code is the "language"
into which the source code is translated for use by the computer.
15. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 453.
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1985 through its subsidiary, defendant Softklone Distributing Corpora-
tion. With a few minor differences, Mirror performed just as Crosstalk
XVI and used a status screen which Microstuff claimed infringed upon
its copyright. Subsequently, Microstuff was purchased by Digital Com-
munications Associates, Incorporated ("Digital").' 6
PROTECTION OF DIGITAL'S DISPLAY BY COMPUTER
PROGRAM COPYRIGHT
Digital claimed that Softklone's copying of Digital's Crosstalk XVI
(version 3.6) "Main Menu" (status screen) display infringed upon Digi-
tal's copyright in the underlying computer program.' 7 The court noted
computer programs are classified as "literary works" and "works of au-
thorship" subject to copyright protection, 18 and copyright protection ex-
tends to both a program's source code and object code."' Further, a
16. Id. In August of 1985 ForeTec created the defendant Softklone Distributing Corpora-
tion ("Softklone"), a Florida corporation, as a wholly owned subsidiary. ForeTec created Soft-
klone for marketing and distributing cloned computer programs like Mirror. In October of
1986, Digital Communications Associates, Incorporated ("Digital"), a Georgia corporation,
purchased Microstuff and was substituted as the plaintiff in the action. Id.
17. Id. at 454.
18. Id. See also Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("[C]omputer programs are classified as literary works for the purposes of copy-
right."), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987). Statutory authority can be found in 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(1),(6) (1977). Title 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include
the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(6) .'.. and other audiovisual works.
Id.
Title 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines the terms "audiovisual works" and "literary works" as
follows:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which
are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as
projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which
the works are embodied.
"Literary works" are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film,
tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.
Id.
19. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 454. See also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233-34 ("[C]opyright
protection extends to a program's source and object codes."); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frank-
1988]
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copyright in a computer program extends protection beyond the pro-
gram's source and object codes to its "structure, sequence, and
organization."1
2 0
The court observed that a computer program is a "copy" of its
screen display since a fixed computer program always produces that
same display. 2' However, a screen display is not a direct "copy" of the
substantive content of the underlying computer program creating it since
a fixed display may be the result of many different programs.22
The court held, therefore, that copyright protection of a computer
program does not extend to its audiovisual screen display, and copying a
program's audiovisual screen display creates no infringement "without
evidence of copying of the program's source code, object code, sequence,
organization or structure. ' 23 The court expressly rejected an opposite
conclusion reached by a Ninth Circuit District Court in Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., which stated that copyright protec-
tion of a computer program does extend to its audiovisual display.24
fin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[A] computer program, whether in
object code or source code .... is protected from unauthorized copying ...."), cert. dismissed,
464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
20. Softkione, 659 F. Supp. at 455 (citing Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248 ("[C]opyright protec-
tion of computer programs may extend beyond the programs' literal code to their structure,
sequence, and organization ....")).
21. Id. at 456. See also M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir.
1986) ("The [computer] program ... is, by definition a 'copy' [of the audiovisual display].").
Statutory authority can be found in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). Title 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines
"copies" and "fixed" for purposes of copyright as follows:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than a
phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images,
or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of
the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
Id.
22. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 455-56. See also Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d
852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[M]any different computer programs can produce the same 'results,'
whether those results are an analysis of financial records or a sequence of images and
sounds."); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[lIt is quite
possible to design a game that would infringe Midway's audiovisual copyright but would use
an entirely different computer program.").
23. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 456.
24. Id. at 455 (citing 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)). The Softklone court believed
that "[tihe Broderbund court based its conclusion on what [the Softklone court believed] to be
an overexpansive and erroneous reading of Whelan. The Third Circuit in Whelan dealt only
[Vol. 8
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PROTECTION OF DIGITAL'S DISPLAY BY DISPLAY COPYRIGHT
Digital also contended Softklone's copying of the Crosstalk XVI
"Main Menu" display infringed upon Digital's valid copyright in that
display.2" Since Digital's certificate of copyright registration was prima
facie evidence of a valid copyright in the display, the burden was there-
fore on Softklone to present evidence questioning the copyrightability of
that display and the sufficiency of its copyright notice.26
Softklone, relying upon Baker v. Selden, 27 contended that the Cross-
talk "Main Menu" status screen display was not copyrightable since it
was a necessary expression of the underlying idea, the computer pro-
gram. Therefore the expression merged into the idea,28 and since a copy-
right protects expressions of ideas only, not the ideas themselves,29 it was
not protected.
The court examined the "merger rule" which provides that an idea
which has only one "necessary" form of expression merges with the ex-
pression and is not copyrightable.3 ° The court found the policy behind
the "merger rule" to be sound since the purpose of copyright law is to
"balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of informa-
tion [use], to promote learning, culture, and development." 31
with the evidentiary use of the copying of screen displays for the purpose of establishing copy-
ing of the underlying computer program." Id. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
25. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 454.
26. Id. at 456.
27. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The Court denied copyright protection for original bookkeeping
forms used in a book explaining a new method of bookkeeping. The Court held that the forms
were "necessary incidents" to the bookkeeping idea since the bookkeeping method could not
be used without them. Hence, the forms, as an expression, merged with the bookkeeping idea
and were therefore not copyrightable. Id.
28. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 456-57.
29. Id. at 457. See also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234 ("It is axiomatic that copyright does not
protect ideas, but only expressions of ideas."), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[P]rotection is given only to the expression of the
idea - not the idea itself."). Statutory authority can be found in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977)
which states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea ... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work."
30. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 457. See also M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d
421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986) ("If there is only one way to express the idea, 'idea' and 'expression'
merge and there is no copyrightable material."); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) ("If other programs can be written or created which
perform the same function . . . then that program is an expression of the idea and hence
copyrightable."), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
31. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 458. See also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235 n.27:
[The courts] must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial;
the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the
community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward for their inge-
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To determine whether an expression and an idea have "merged," a
court must define the underlying idea behind the copyrighted work and
then determine whether alternative means of expressing the idea exist.32
The Softklone court found the "idea" to be the process or manner by
which the status screen display operated or functioned, and the "expres-
sion" to be the method by which that "idea" was communicated or con-
veyed to the user.33 Certain aspects of the display were found to be
unrelated to the underlying computer program's operation and were
therefore copyrightable "expression." 34
Softklone also contended the status screen display did not merely
"explain" the operation of the underlying computer program, but was
"used" as part of its operation."a The court, however, held that the in-
tended use, or an industry's use, of an article eligible for copyright does
not bar or invalidate its copyright registration.36 A work which "ex-
plains" may also be "used," that is, serve some function other than as a
mere explanation. That part of the work which "explains" is copyright-
able if it is not necessary to the underlying idea.37
Softklone maintained that the status screen display was like the "in-
put format cards" involved in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University
Computing Co.3 Like the input format cards, the status screen display
had titles, shaded areas, and specific columns in which to place certain
nuity and labour [sic]; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improve-
ments, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
Id.
See also Apple, 714 F.2d at 1253 ("[A court must consider] the preservation of the balance
between competition and protection reflected in the ... copyright laws.").
32. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 458.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 459. The arrangement of the parameter/command terms were not related to
how the computer operated. Also, the capitalizing and highlighting of the first two letters of
the parameter/command terms displayed on the status screen were not necessary to the func-
tioning of the status screen. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("We find nothing in the copy-
right statute to support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article
eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration."). For example, the use of china
statuettes, copyrighted as works of art, as bases for electric lamps does not invalidate the copy-
right. Id.
37. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 459.
38. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). The plaintiff had developed a computer program
for performing structural analyses on buildings. The program operated on data entered by the
user. The data had to be entered in a specific sequence. "Input format cards," with titles and
shaded areas, were published and copyrighted by the plaintiff to assist the user in entering the
data in the correct sequence. The court held that since the defendant had merely copied the
idea, the sequence of the data entries, and not the format cards, the copyright was not in-
fringed. Id. at 1013-14.
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data.3 9 Softklone claimed that the display, like the input format cards,
was a necessary expression of the idea which was the particular sequence
of data to be entered by the user of the underlying computer program;
therefore, the expression (display) merged with the idea and was not
copyrightable. °
The court disagreed, however, pointing out that the Synercom de-
fendants had copied merely the sequence of data input which was rele-
vant to the operation of the underlying computer program (the "idea");
they did not copy the arrangement and appearance of the format cards
(the "expression"). In contrast, Softklone did copy the arrangement and
appearance of Digital's Crosstalk XVI "Main Menu" display.4"
The court further decided that Digital's status screen display ar-
rangement, unlike the Synercom input format cards, involved "consider-
able stylistic creativity and authorship above and beyond the ideas
embodied in the status screen."42 Moreover, since many alternative ar-
rangements were possible, the display was not a necessary expression of
the underlying idea, the computer program. Hence, Digital's mode of
expression of the status screen display did not "merge" with the idea and
was therefore copyrightable.43
Softklone also contended that Digital's display was not copyright-
able because it was a "blank form," conveying no information itself but
merely recording the data as entered by the user." "[B]lank forms
which do not convey information or contain original pictorial expression
are not copyrightable."4 5
The court noted that the "litmus [test] seems to be whether the ma-
terial proffered for copyright undertakes to express."4 6 The determina-
39. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 459.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 460.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 461. See also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1986) which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applications
for registration of such works cannot be entertained:
(c) Blank forms, such as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank
checks, scorecards, address books, report forms, order forms, and the like, which are
designed for recording information and do not in themselves convey information.
Id.
45. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 461 (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1983)).
46. Id. (quoting Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1011 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
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tion as to whether a work conveys information and is therefore
copyrightable must be made on a case by case basis.47 The court held
that the status screen display, even if found to be a "form," clearly ex-
pressed and conveyed information; hence, it was copyrightable.48
The court further held that Digital's status screen display was copy-
rightable as a "literary work" under the 1976 Copyright Act ("the
Act").49 Moreover, Digital's display was a "compilation" of parameter/
command terms since it was an " 'assembling' of 'data' or information
'arranged' in such a way as to constitute 'an original work of author-
ship.' , o Therefore, it was copyrightable under section 103 of the Act.5'
Hence, since the display's compliance with section 102 of the Act was
not challenged by Softklone, and it was already held not to be a necessary
expression of an idea, it was "copyrightable to the extent of its arrange-
ment and design of parameter/command terms."
5 2
ADEQUACY OF DIGITAL'S NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT
Softklone alternatively claimed that even if Digital's display was
copyrightable subject matter, Digital forfeited any copyright protection
for its status screen display because Digital failed to provide adequate
copyright notice on the display. 3 The court disagreed, holding that the
copyright notices on the "boot-up" or sign-on screen display and pages of
the user manual illustrating the display gave the requisite "reasonable
notice of the claim of copyright" and constituted "a reasonable effort...
to add notice" to the status screen display.54
47. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 461.
48. Id. at 462.
49. Id. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1977). See supra note 18.
50. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 463.
51. Id. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(a) (1977). See infra note 71.
52. Sofiklone, 659 F. Supp. at 463.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 464. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(c), 405(a)(2) (1977). Title 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) pro-
vides as follows:
Position of Notice.-The notice [of copyright] shall be affixed to the copies in
such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. The
Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, as examples, specific methods of
affixation and positions of the notice on various types of works that will satisfy this
requirement, but these specifications shall not be considered exhaustive.
Id. Title 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Effect of Omission [of Notice] on Copyright.-The omission of the copyright
notice prescribed by sections 401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords publicly
distributed by authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the copyright in a
work if-
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five years
after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to
[Vol. 8
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
DIGITAL'S COPYRIGHTED WORK WAS COPIED By SOFTKLONE
The court concluded that Softklone had copied Digital's copy-
righted status screen display; Softklone had acknowledged having access
to Digital's Crosstalk XVI (version 3.6) prior to developing its Mirror
program and display;55 and that Softklone's Mirror status screen display
was substantially similar to Digital's Crosstalk XVI (version 3.6) "Main
Menu" (status screen) display, capturing the "total concept and feel" of
Digital's display.56
Hence, since Digital owned a valid copyright protecting its status
screen display which Softklone had copied, thereby infringing Digital's
copyright, the court permanently enjoined Softklone from distributing
anything constituting an infringement of Digital's copyright in its Cross-
talk XVI (version 3.6) "Main Menu" (status screen) display.
57
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DISPLAYS
A computer program's audiovisual display may be protected by a
copyright. Section 102 of the Act provides protection for "audiovisual
works" and "literary works."58 An audiovisual display for a computer-
driven video game for example, is copyrightable as an original "audiovi-
sual work."59 The visual and aural features of a video game's display can
be sufficiently "original" within the meaning of section 102(a) of Title 17
of the United States Code;' and the computer's memory devices satisfy
the statutory requirement under section 102(a) of a "copy" in which the
display's audiovisual work is "fixed."'"
A computer program is also copyrightable. Protection under a
copyright in a program extends to both the program's source code and
all copies or phonorecords that are distributed to the public in the United States after
the omission has been discovered.
Id.
55. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 464-65.
56. Id. at 465. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[The defendants] captured the 'total concept and feel' of
the [plaintiff's work].").
57. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 465.
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(l) (1977). See supra note 18.
59. Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The display
satisfies the statutory definition of an original 'audiovisual work,' and the memory devices of
the game satisfy the statutory requirement of a 'copy' in which the work is 'fixed.' " Hence, it
is appropriate subject matter for copyright protection.). See also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l., 685 F.2d 870, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
746 (N.D. I11. 1983).
60. Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-56.
61. Williams, 685 F.2d at 874. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (supra notes 21,18,
respectively).
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object code.62 But, copyright protection may extend even beyond the
literal elements (the source and object codes) of the program.6 3
The Act extends copyright protection to "literary works."' 64 Case
law has extended copyright protection beyond the literal elements of the
work. Copyrights of some literary works can be infringed even when
there is no substantial similarity between the works' literal elements. For
example, copying of the plot or plot devices in a play or book can violate
a copyright.6 5 Computer programs are classified as literary works for the
purposes of copyright.6 6 Hence, by analogy, the copyright in a computer
program may be infringed even with no copying of the program's literal
elements, the source and/or object codes.6 7
The purpose behind United States copyright law is to provide pro-
tection, and thus incentive for original creations, while also providing for
dissemination of information to promote learning, culture, and develop-
ment. 68 The most expensive and difficult aspect of creating a computer
program is the development of its structure and logic, 69 that is, planning
and establishing the sequence(s) of functions and operations the program
must perform. Therefore, extending copyright protection beyond a pro-
gram's literal elements (the codes) to its structure and organization pro-
vides incentive for its creation by protecting that most valuable aspect.7 "
Moreover, the Act indicates that Congress knew "that the sequence and
order could be parts of the expression, not the idea, of a work;"" there-
62. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233-34, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987). See also
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[A]
computer program, whether in object code or source code,... is protected from unauthorized
copying ...."), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
63. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1977). See supra note 18.
65. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1234 n.26.
68. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); See also
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) ("...
the preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the ... copy-
right laws."), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
69. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231, 1237.
70. Id. at 1237.
71. Id. at 1239.
Although the [Copyright Act] does not use the terms "sequence," "order" or "struc-
ture," it is clear from the definition of compilations and derivative works, and the
protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact that the sequencing
and ordering of materials could be copyrighted, i.e., that the sequence and order
could be parts of the expression, not the idea, of a work.
Id.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(a) (1977). Title 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) provides that "[t]he subject
matter of copyright as specified by section 102 [see supra note 18] includes compilations and
[Vol. 8
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fore, Congress intended the structure and organization of a literary work
to be part of the expression protectible by copyright.72 Hence, extending
copyright protection in a computer program beyond its literal elements
to its structure and organization is: analogous to such an extension of
protection in a play or book; consistent with the purpose behind copy-
right law; and consistent with the intent of Congress.
However, to be copyrightable, the computer program's sequence
and form must be separable from its underlying idea; they must not be
the necessary form of expression of the idea. If they are not separable,
the expression (the sequence and form) merges with the idea73 and is not
derivative works. Title 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines "compilation" and "derivative work" as
follows:
A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexist-
ing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term
"compilation" includes collective works.
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".
Id.
72. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237. An illustration of the difference between an "idea" and its
"expression" is found in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978):
A hypothetical, oversimplified, may serve to illuminate the idea versus expres-
sion controversy. The familiar "figure-H" pattern of an automobile stick is chosen
arbitrarily by an auto manufacturer. Several different patterns may be imagined,
some more convenient for the driver or easier to manufacture than others, but all
representing possible configurations. The pattern chosen is arbitrary, but once cho-
sen, it is the only pattern which will work in a particular model. The pattern (analo-
gous to the computer "format") may be expressed in several different ways: by a
prose description in a driver's manual, through a diagram, photograph, or driver
training film, or otherwise. Each of these expressions may presumably be protected
through copyright. But the copyright protects copying of the particular expressions
of the pattern, and does not prohibit another manufacturer from marketing a car
using the same pattern. Use of the same pattern might be socially desirable, as it
would reduce the retraining of drivers. Likewise, the second manufacturer is free to
use its own prose descriptions, photographs, diagrams, or the like, so long as these
materials take the form of original expressions of the copied idea (however similar
they may be to the first manufacturer's materials) rather than copies of the expres-
sions themselves. Admittedly, there are many more possible choices of computer
formats, and the decision among them more arbitrary, but this does not detract from
the force of the analogy.
Id.
73. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
[W]here the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and dia-
grams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and
diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith
to the public; not given for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of
the art, but for the purpose of practical application.
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copyrightable, since copyright does not protect ideas, only expressions of
ideas. 74
In the Ninth Circuit, however, copyright protection in computer
programs has been extended even further. The court in Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc." extended protection from a copy-
right in a computer program, not only to the overall structure of the
program, but to its audiovisual display as well.76 This would have the
apparent effect of rendering a separate copyright in the display unneces-
sary. The Broderbund court appeared to interpret Whelan Associates v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory," a Third Circuit decision, broadly, while of-
fering no supporting rationale.
In Whelan, the plaintiff, in the business of developing and marketing
custom computer programs, developed a program for the defendants
who were manufacturers of dental devices. The plaintiff and defendant
shared in the profits from marketing the program to other dental labora-
tories. Some time later, the defendants adapted the program for use on
the smaller personal computers which had become increasingly popular
among dental laboratories. The defendants unilaterally terminated their
association with the plaintiff and marketed the adapted program them-
selves. The plaintiffs successfully alleged that due to "overall structural
similarities" between the two programs, the defendants were infringing
upon the plaintiff's copyright in the original program.78
The Whelan court agreed, holding that a copyright in a computer
program protected the overall structure and organization of the program,
not just the source and object codes. The overall structure, sequence,
and organization of the program could be distinguished from the under-
lying idea, and therefore it was a copyrightable expression.79
In Broderbund the facts were similar, but the Broderbund court ex-
Id. at 103.
74. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987). See also
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[P]rotection is given only to the expression of the
idea - not the idea itself."); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977) ("In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
75. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
76. Id. at 1133.
77. 797 F.2d at 1248, cert. denied, - U.S. -_, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
78. Id. at 1228. Most of the programs' file structures and screen outputs were virtually
identical; and five particularly important sub-routines within both programs performed almost
identically in both programs. Id.




tended the program's copyright protection even further than did the
Whelan court. The defendant was marketing a computer program
which, similar to that of the plaintiffs, enabled its user to create custom-
ized greeting cards. The plaintiffs successfully alleged that the overall
appearance, structure, and sequence of the audiovisual displays in the
defendant's program infringed on their copyrighted program.8 °
The Broderbund court agreed, stating that "Whelan [stood] for the
proposition that copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects
of a computer program, but rather that it extends to the overall structure
of a program, including its audiovisual displays."'" The court gave no
rationale for including the display within the copyright protection of the
program.
POSSIBLE ARGUMENT FOR EXTENDED PROTECTION
UNDER BRODERBUND
A possible argument for the conclusion reached in Broderbund may
be found in an expansive reading of Whelan. A supporting rationale
could read as follows:
The purpose of United States copyright law is to provide a "balance
between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information for pro-
moting learning, culture and development."82 The most expensive and
difficult part of creating a computer program is the development of its
structure.83 "[T]he 'look and feel' of a computer software product often
involves much more creativity and often is of greater commercial value
than the program code which implements the product. '84 Therefore,
protection of the structure of the computer program by the program's
copyright provides incentive for its creation.8" Moreover, extension of the
computer program's copyright protection to its structure fulfills the in-
tent of Congress as expressed in the Copyright Act of 1976.86
The "look and feel" of a computer program includes its audiovisual
display, since that is how the user interacts with, or uses, the program.
To the user, the computer program's audiovisual display is the expres-
80. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
81. Id. at 1133.
82. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). See supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
83. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1237.
86. Id. at 1239. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1977).
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sion of the underlying idea (i.e., the function performed by the program).
Further, the display is typically designed and arranged while the overall
structure and organization of the program is being designed, prior to the
writing of the program's source code. 7 Therefore, the display should be
protected as part of the program's overall structure, provided a separable
"idea" exists so that the display is not a necessary expression causing it
to "merge"88 with the idea.
The above rationale has several problems, however. First, although
Congress' intent behind the Act was to provide incentive through protec-
tion, that alone cannot justify extending protection under a computer
program's copyright to anything and everything associated with that pro-
gram. Though the display may be designed concurrently with the overall
structure and organization of the program, it cannot really be considered
as part of that structure. For example, the display, just as a series of
audio tones or textual printouts, is merely the result of the operation of
the program. Besides, if Congress had intended for a copyright's protec-
tion to extend that far, Congress would probably have expressly said so.
Congress has provided in specific terms for copyright protection through
the Act and its language should be construed narrowly.
Second, this rationale makes no distinction for the situation where
the display is a "blank form" which merely records information (entered
by the user of the program) but conveys no information itself. Extending
copyright protection to blank forms is expressly prohibited by section
202.1(c) of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 9
Finally, including an audiovisual display within the copyright pro-
tection in a computer program is prevented by the "copy anomaly" as
discussed by the court in Softklone.9 ° The Act requires that the subject
matter of a copyright be "fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression,"'"
and to be "fixed" it must be embodied in a "copy."'9 2 While the com-
puter program is a copy of its display,9 3 the display is not a copy of its
program.94 Therefore, since the display is not "fixed" in the program, it
87. See, e.g., Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 463.
88. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986). See also Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dis-
missed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 44.
90. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1977). See supra note 18.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). See supra note 21.
93. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986). ("The [com-
puter] program ... is, by definition a 'copy' [of the audiovisual display].").
94. See Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[M]any different
computer programs can produce the same 'results,' whether those results are an analysis of
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cannot be eligible for protection under the copyright in the program.
A COPYRIGHT IN A COMPUTER PROGRAM MAY NOT
PROTECT THE DISPLAY
The Softklone decision expressly limits the extent of protection
available from a copyright in a computer program. A copyright in a
computer program cannot extend protection to the program's audiovi-
sual display, so the display must be protected by its own copyright."
In so holding, the Softklone court emphasized the apparent anom-
aly, due to the nature of computers, wherein a computer program is con-
sidered a "copy" of its audiovisual display, but a display is not
considered a copy of its program. 96 Therefore, since the display is not a
copy of its copyrighted program, it is not protected.
However, under the Broderbund extension, even though a display is
not a copy of its program, it would be protected nonetheless. The effect
of this extension would be to create the situation where any computer
program producing the same display as that produced by a copyrighted
program would infringe upon that copyright. Even if the programs were
in no way similar and the display was merely a blank form conveying no
information, an infringement would result.
There is little case law pertaining to this question of whether a copy-
right in a computer program also protects the program's audiovisual dis-
play. But, with Softklone expressly rejecting Broderbund, the battle line
appears more distinct. The Third Circuit, in Whelan, held that "copy-
right protection of computer programs may extend beyond the programs'
literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization."97 The Ninth
Circuit District Court in Broderbund agreed, holding that "copyright
protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but
rather . . . extends to the overall structure of a program."9 " But, it held
further that such protection "includ[es the program's] audiovisual
display."99
Now, after the Softklone court's rejection of Broderbund in favor of
Whelan, the Third and Eleventh Circuits (in Whelan and Softklone, re-
financial records or a sequence of images and sounds."); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Il1. 1983) ("[I]t is quite possible to design a game that would infringe
Midway's audiovisual copyright but would use an entirely different computer program.").
95. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 456.
96. Id. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
97. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
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spectively) extend a computer program's copyright protection beyond
the program's source and object codes to its overall structure and organi-
zation. The Ninth Circuit (in Broderbund) goes further, extending that
protection to the program's audiovisual display as well.
Hence, it may depend upon where the infringement action is filed as
to whether or not a computer display is protected by the copyright in the
underlying program. Alleged copiers/infringers of a display would hope
to be sued in the Third or Eleventh Circuits, while the copyright holder
would like to pursue his or her rights in the Ninth Circuit.
COPYRIGHT CRITERIA FOR AUDIOVISUAL DISPLAY
A non-pictorial audiovisual display, often used for other than mere
entertainment, may be protected by its own copyright. However, the dis-
play must not be a necessary expression of its underlying idea, and it
must not be a "blank form" merely recording data, but must convey in-
formation to its user.
The underlying idea is the process or manner by which the display
operates, namely, the function performed by the computer program. The
expression is the method by which the idea is communicated or conveyed
to the user, namely, the display. For the display not to be a necessary
expression of its underlying idea, it must not be a necessary incident to
the program. Use or operation of the program must not be dependent
upon the display. The program should be capable of functioning inde-
pendently of the display. For example, operation of Digital's Crosstalk
program was not dependent upon the visual aspects (highlighting and
capitalization of the first two letters of the parameter/command terms)
of the display. Further, the display should involve creativity and origi-
nality beyond the basic ideas embodied within the display; and the dis-
play should be merely one of several alternatives possible to convey the
desired expression.
The display must also not be a blank form. It must provide some
information to its user. For example, although Digital's Crosstalk dis-
play recorded the parameter/command terms entered by its user, it also
conveyed information by displaying the operational status of the Cross-
talk program in a convenient and readable form as it was functioning.
SUBSEQUENT IMPROVEMENT AND POTENTIAL
INFRINGEMENT BY OTHERS
Competing software developers can still improve and build upon
computer programs and displays already created and copyrighted. To
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avoid copyright infringement, subsequent software developers must use
different structures for their underlying programs, and their audiovisual
displays' "original works" must not be substantially similar to a prior
copyrighted display.
CONCLUSION
The Softklone decision appears to have greater support than the
Broderbund decision. The "copy" anomaly which prevents extending a
computer program's copyright protection to its audiovisual display, as
discussed and relied upon in Softklone, has statutory support'o° and case
law support' ' which recognize the unusual nature of computers as the
cause of that anomaly.
Extension of protection from a copyright in a computer program to
its audiovisual display as in Broderbund appears to have support only in
an over-expansive interpretation of prior case law which, in turn, tries to
infer this extension from the intent of Congress as expressed in the Copy-
right Act of 1976.102 Moreover, the apparent effect of the Broderbund
extension of protection would be to extend copyright protection to "nec-
essary expressions," contrary to case law,' °3 and to "blank forms," con-
trary to federal regulation.' °M
Mark A. Dalla Valle
100. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1977).
101. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The [computer]
program ... is, by definition a 'copy' [of the audiovisual display]."). See also Stem Elecs., Inc.
v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[M]any different computer programs can produce
the same 'results,' whether those results are an analysis of financial records or a sequence of
images and sounds."); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. 11. 1983) ("[I]t is
quite possible to design a game that would infringe Midway's audiovisual copyright but would
use an entirely different computer program.").
102. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
103. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 436 ("If there is only one way to express the idea, 'idea' and
'expression' merge and there is no copyrightable material."). See also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) ("If other programs can be
written or created which perform the same function... then that program is an expression of
the idea and hence copyrightable."), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
104. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1986).
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